Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age by Diller, Matthew
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 6 
1995 
Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age 
Matthew Diller 
Fordham University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Legal History Commons, Legal Profession Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Social 
Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/13 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
POVERTY LAWYERING IN THE
GOLDEN AGE
Matthew Diller*
BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MoVE-
MENT, 1960-1973. By Martha F. Davis. New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 187. $26.50.
The 1960s was a decade of extremes. The decade opened with
an almost-unbounded sense of optimism about America. With the
nation led by a charismatic young President, it seemed that all
problems and challenges could be solved if given sufficient atten-
tion. The United States, it was claimed, could even put a man on
the moon. Despite NASA's success, the decade ended with a tu-
mult of dashed hopes - defeat in Vietnam, economic stagnation,
political assassination, Chappaquidick, and, ultimately, the disillu-
sionment of Watergate. Views on poverty during the 1960s track
this fall from optimism to disillusionment. The "war on poverty"
declared by President Johnson was based on a faith that poverty
could be eliminated after a brief pitched campaign led by a handful
of social scientists. The aftermath of this "war" was an era of de-
spair in which poverty was widely regarded as intractable.
Martha Davis's Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights
Movement, 1960-1973,1 provides a well written and engrossing ac-
count of the efforts of a few young lawyers to wage war on poverty
on their own terms. Davis focuses on the development and execu-
tion of Edward Sparer's plan to beat poverty in the courtroom
through a series of test cases designed to create a judicially recog-
nized "right to live" - a right of access to the essentials of subsis-
tence.2 The plan ended in failure when the Supreme Court
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B. 1981, J.D. 1985, Harvard. -
Ed. Portions of this review draw heavily on my experiences as a staff attorney in the Civil
Appeals and Law Reform Unit of The Legal Aid Society in New York City from 1986 until
1993. I am grateful to many people for their help on this project and comments on drafts,
including Jane Booth, Tracy Higgins, Katherine Kennedy, Christopher Lamb, Yvette LeRoy,
Peter Margulies, Nancy Morawetz, Russell Pearce, Terry Smith, and Bill Treanor. I would
also like to thank John Butler, Peter Mignone, and Daniel Toweil for their assistance in
research.
1. Martha Davis is a staff attorney for the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund.
2. The right to live was derived from the scholarly work of Delafield Smith and Joseph
lbssman, & Jacobus tenBroek. A. DELAIMLD SmITH, Trm RIGHT TO LIFE (1955); Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL- L. REv. 341 (1949);
see also Frank I. Michehnan, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendmen 83 HArv. L. REv. 7 (1969). For a more recent
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resoundingly rejected not only the right to live thesis but also any
heightened judicial scrutiny for programs that dispense means of
subsistence.3 On the legislative level, Congress's rejection of Presi-
dent Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, which was opposed by both
the left and the right, marked the end of serious efforts to achieve a
federally guaranteed minimum income for families with children
(pp. 138-39).
Davis has chosen fertile ground. Like the war on poverty itself,
Sparer's litigation strategy was a failure when judged by its own
goals. But it nonetheless produced substantial and lasting interme-
diate triumphs that have had profound repercussions. This tanta-
lizing mixture of success and failure makes the story of Sparer and
his colleagues ripe for examination. Their successes give rise to the
question: Why did ultimate victory prove elusive? This question
implicates basic issues concerning the role of litigation and lawyers
in bringing about fundamental changes in society. More simply put,
what should lawyers for the poor do, and what can they
accomplish?
Brutal Need is also timely and important because it has arrived
at a period when legal scholars have shown renewed interest in the
theory and practice of poverty law.4 Much of this literature has fo-
argument in favor of judicial recognition of a constitutional right to a subsistence income, see
Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking our Duty to the Poor,
39 HASriNGS LJ. 1 (1987). A number of scholars have critiqued the right to live thesis. See
Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U. L.Q. 695; Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for Welfare Rights, 1985 B.Y.U. L.
Rv. 201; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1972 Sup. Cr. REv. 41.
3. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
4. Examples of this work include: GERALD P. L6PEZ, RBEaLn ous LAwyEIuNo: ONE
CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGREsswE LAW PRAcrxcE (1992); Richard L. Abel, Law Without
Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. Rav. 474 (1985); Anthony V.
Alfleri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANOE 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies]; Anthony V. Alfieri,
Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HAS1INGS LJ. 769 (1992) [hereinafter Alfieri, Dis-
abled Clients]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons
of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991) [hereinafter Allieri, Reconstructive Poverty
Law]; Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Prac-
tical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687 (1992); Rob-
ert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASrnOs L. 971 (1992);
Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory of Re.
ceiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASrINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Austin Sarat, "... The
Law is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990); Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyer-
ing and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 947, 948 n.3 (1992) [hereinafter Trem-
blay, Rebellious Lawyering]; Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1
D.C. L. REv. 123 (1992); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly On the Paradox of Lawyeringfor
the Poor, 56 BRooFa L. REv. 861 (1990) [hereinafter White, The Paradox of Lawyering];
Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1987-88); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L.
REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Subordination]; Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Les-
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cused on the relationship between poverty lawyers and their clients.
Davis's account adds fuel to this discussion because it traces how
the lawyers implementing Sparer's test-case strategy strayed from
the social movement agitating for welfare rights. Although Davis
does not attempt any definitive assessment of the impact of this
trend, she does conclude that "the failure of Sparer's welfare rights
litigation strategy mitigates against reliance on litigation as the sole
focus of a broad effort to promote change in the welfare system" (p.
145).
In developing her account, Davis carefully weaves together a
number of stories, including a history of legal representation of the
poor (pp. 10-21), an account of the social protest movement agitat-
ing for welfare rights (pp. 40-55), and short biographies of key indi-
viduals (pp. 22-27, 82-86). Accounts by other writers deal more
comprehensively with a number of these subjects, such as the
founding of the Legal Services Program,5 the welfare rights move-
ment,6 and the Supreme Court's handling of poverty litigation.7
Brutal Need, however, connects these subjects in a way that en-
riches our understanding of each of them.8
Written for a general readership, Brutal Need does not provide
detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's welfare decisions between
1967 and 1973. Nonetheless, its fascinating accounts of the lawyer-
ing that led up to those decisions are a notable contribution to the
literature. These accounts have all of the attributes of vintage war
stories. They are filled with clashes of strong personalities, strategic
maneuvers to influence the Supreme Court's docket, missteps at
oral argument, and other details that together convey a flavor of the
times and the cases.
These war stories, of course, are more than simply entertaining.
The accounts highlight the lawyers' strategic choices in crafting law-
sons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 699 [hereinafter White,
To Learn and Teach].
5. See EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUsTmCE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
6. See NICK KoTz & MARY LYNN KoTZ, A PASSION FOR EQUALrrY: GEORGE A. WILEY
AND THE MOVEMENT (1977); FRANCES Fox Prvmq & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PO-
P'L's MovEmENTs 264-359 (1977).
7. See SusAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN CouRr THm LEGAL SERvICEs PROGRAM
AND SuPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990).
8. Barbara Sard has also written a perceptive analysis of litigation strategies in the wel-
fare context. See Barbara Sard, The Role of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 CLEARNo.
HOUSE REv. 367 (1988). Edward Sparer has provided an insightful evaluation of the strategy
he originated. See Edward V. Sparer, The Right to Welfare; in THM RmHTS OF AMERICANS:
WHAT TImY ARE - WHAT TmY SHOULD BE 65 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1971); see also LAW-
RENCE, supra note 7, at 48-51 (discussing Sparer's strategy); ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDO-
Manr. THE LMIrs OF LImTATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE 130-40 (1982) (same); Jack
Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC.
ASsN. B. Crry N.Y. 320, 335-42 (1974) (same).
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suits to serve as building blocks for the right to live principle. In
this way, Brutal Need places the cases in the context of Sparer's
overall plan. For example, instead of viewing King v. Smith9 as a
Social Security Act case, Shapiro v. Thompson'0 as a right-to-travel
case, Goldberg v. Kelly" as a due process case, and Dandridge v.
Williams'2 as an equal protection case, all four cases emerge as
pieces of the larger strategy.
Davis's account of the lawyering in Goldberg (pp. 81-118) is par-
ticularly well developed. She has interviewed most of those in-
volved in the case, including Professor Charles Reich, whose
articles provided the intellectual underpinnings for the case;13 Jus-
tice Brennan and two of his law clerks who worked on the opinion
of the Court; Judge Wilfred Feinberg, who wrote the opinion for
the three-judge court that heard the case initially; the attorneys who
argued the case for the plaintiffs and the defendants at the trial
level and on appeal; and the attorneys at Mobilization for Youth
Legal Services - a New York City neighborhood law office - who
performed the initial intake interview with John Kelly and put to-
gether the case.14
In this review, I will first examine Davis's discussion of the rela-
tionship between Sparer's test-case strategy and the social move-
ment seeking welfare rights. I will also consider a number of
objections leveled by academics at lawyer-dominated strategies for
social change. In the second portion of this review, I will consider
the legacy of the work of Sparer and his contemporaries in terms of
its impact on poverty lawyers practicing today. I will also consider
the claim of a number of academics that this legacy has contributed
to the creation of a crisis in contemporary poverty law.
I. THE TEST-CASE STRATEGY
A. Development of the Strategy
In the early 1960s, the idea that lawyers had a role to play in
eliminating poverty was new. Prior to the 1960s, legal aid societies
provided legal representation to the poor as a means of allowing
access to the justice system (pp. 10-21). Although legal aid work
9. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
10. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
11. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
12. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
13. See Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Is-
sues, 74 YALE LJ. 1245 (1965); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).
14. Davis has also drawn on archival material, including drafts of the opinions and reac-




made the justice system more fair and helped many individuals re-
solve disputes, legal aid lawyers did not perceive their mission as
the eradication of poverty through the reform of social and legal
institutions. In an effort to serve greater numbers of clients, few
cases were litigated, and even fewer appealed.'s
The successes of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, however,
created a new image of the lawyer - as agent of social change.16
To some, this new conception seemed transferable from the realm
of civil fights to the arena of economic rights. The analogy proved
controversial, even among advocates for the poor. In particular,
the young activist lawyers who promoted the idea of using legal
representation as a means of fighting poverty relentlessly criticized
the existing legal aid societies and their "band-aid" work.' 7 The
legal aid societies, well connected with the established bar, fought
back.'8 The establishment of the Legal Services Program of the Of-
fice of Economic Opportunity in 1965 made clear the triumph of
the "law reform" vision. The inclusion of the Legal Services Pro-
gram in the agency spearheading the war on poverty was an ac-
knowledgement that legal representation was a weapon to be
deployed in the war.19
Although Davis recounts this tension between the advocates of
law reform and the defenders of traditional legal aid (pp. 33-34),
the disputes among the law reform activists are more central to the
issues with which she deals. The activists did not agree among
themselves on the issue of how lawyers for the poor should go
about reforming the law.20 They developed at least three models of
achieving social change. The first school of thought viewed the law-
15. Pp. 10-21; JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 3-19.
16. The limitations of the Legal Defense Fund's accomplishments were not apparent in
the early 1960s. The difficulties of translating victories in the courtroom into changed reali-
ties have since become widely recognized. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW
HopE: CAN CoUsRS BRING ABOUT SociAL CHANGE? 42-106 (1991). Moreover, critics have
questioned whether the strategy of seeking integration and the establishment of legal rights
has promoted equality. See eg., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L REV. 1049, 1052-57 (1978). For fuller treat-
ments of the Legal Defense Fund's litigation strategy, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN
THE CouRrs (1994); MARK TUsHNET, MAKING CVIL RIGHTS LAw: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-61 (1994) [hereinafter TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS
LAw]; MARK TusHNEr, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCA-
TION, 1925-1950 (1987).
17. JOHNsON, supra note 5, at 45-47, 51.
18. Id. at 47-49.
19. Id. at 39-43. Although the leadership of the Legal Services Program placed a heavy
emphasis on law reform work, id. at 167, the program funded traditional legal aid societies, as
well as new organizations dedicated to achieving social change, id. at 101.




yer as part of a team of professionals who would work comprehen-
sively with individuals to provide a package of social, educational,
and legal services.21 This model, which formed the basis of a short-
lived program in New Haven, was rooted in the view that "cultural
poverty" causes economic poverty. The second view focused on
neighborhood activism.22 This model, as developed by Edgar and
Jean Cahn, asserted that poverty lawyers should serve as a resource
for poor communities to make local government and other institu-
tions more responsive on a local level and to assist poor communi-
ties in developing their own institutions and leaders.23 The third
alternative, devised by Sparer and social analyst Elizabeth Wick-
enden, called for the development of a planned series of test cases
designed to achieve judicial recognition of a constitutional right to a
subsistence income.24
Sparer's premise was radically different from the other concep-
tions. Although the New Haven model and the Cahns' proposal
reflected the war on poverty's general emphasis on eliminating lo-
calized pockets of poverty, Sparer's model sought reform on the
national level.25 It is not difficult to see how Sparer's communist
past (pp. 22-24) led him to reject diagnoses of poverty that focused
on lack of opportunity due to personal or cultural deprivation. For
Sparer, poverty was not due to a lack of skills or education; it was
caused by a deprivation of power. Litigation was a means of
achieving power in order to redistribute resources.
Davis does not pursue the progress of legal services programs
that sought to implement the Cahns' model.2 6 Instead, she traces
the establishment of the legal unit directed by Sparer at Mobiliza-
tion for Youth (MFY) in New York City and the efforts to imple-
ment Sparer's strategy (pp. 26-39). There is a certain irony to the
fact that MEFY, a comprehensive neighborhood social service pro-
gram, provided the initial venue for the implementation of Sparer's
plan - Sparer's approach was the least neighborhood-oriented of
all the proposals. Not surprisingly, Sparer and MFY quickly were
at odds with one another, and the legal unit separated from its par-
ent organization (pp. 31-32). Going a step further, Sparer soon con-
cluded that the press of the caseload in a neighborhood law office
made it impossible to focus on test cases. In 1965, he left the legal
21. See iL at 25-27.
22. See Edgar S. Calm & Jean C. Calm, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73
YALE LJ. 1317, 1334-52 (1964).
23. See id.
24. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 23-24.
25. See BRYANT GARTH, NEIOHBOmOOD LAw FmiRs FOR THE POOR 21-22 (1980);
JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 23-24.
26. The New Haven model was never fully implemented. See JoNsON, supra note 5, at
1406 [Vol. 93:1401
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unit to found the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law ("the
Center"), which would become an office devoted to strategic activi-
ties, rather than direct service (pp. 34-36).
B. The Evolution of the "Think Tank" Approach to
Poverty Litigation
The progression from a legal component of a social service or-
ganization to an independent law office to a specialized office deal-
ing only with strategic litigation suggests an evolution in which the
lawyers assumed more and more autonomy. Freed from the de-
mands of serving the day-to-day legal needs of poor individuals and
organized groups, the lawyers could set their own agenda and then
find the clients necessary to bring the cases. The increasing dis-
tance between the Center and its client base is a major theme of
Brutal Need.
Sparer did not conceive of the test-case strategy as calling for
such lawyer domination over the litigation agenda. Instead, Sparer
intended to integrate his strategy with the political and social move-
ment for reform (p. 73). Once again, the civil rights movement
presented a model. Sparer intended the Center to collaborate
closely with the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) -
the leading organization of welfare recipients - just as the Legal
Defense Fund's activities in the courtroom worked in synergy with
the demonstrations and civil disobedience of the civil rights move-
ment.27 Thus, under Sparer's direction, the MFY legal unit and the
Center focused on organizing and educating recipients. For exam-
ple, they initiated a campaign to urge New York City recipients to
apply for welfare grants for specialized needs (pp. 46-51).
Although under the law these grants were available, case workers
rarely issued them. The special grants campaign was taken up by
NWRO and proved to be an effective tool for educating and mobil-
izing recipients.
Davis traces the waning of the Center's commitment to working
in tandem with the social movement (pp. 72-76, 99-100). Sparer left
the Center in 1967 to begin a career in teaching. By that time, Da-
vis concludes, the staff viewed the Center as "a sort of high-pow-
ered think tank, generating its own legal strategies" (p. 73). She
depicts Lee Albert, who eventually replaced Sparer, as having stel-
lar legal credentials but no experience in poverty law and, more
27. Although the NAACP Legal Defense Fund did not foment social action in the way
that Sparer advocated, the two strategies nonetheless complemented each other. Rosm,-
BERG, supra note 16, at 147. Moreover, the Legal Defense Fund supported the social move-
ment by representing protesters. See GREENBERG, supra note 16, at 267-69; TusHNr,
MAMNG CIVIL RiGors LAW, supra note 16, at 305-06.
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importantly, no interest in nurturing relations with welfare recipient
groups (p. 74).
As Davis describes it, under Albert's direction the Center's
work with the NWRO dwindled, and the Center acted aggressively
to set and control the course of law reform litigation in the welfare
area.28 These efforts included elbowing neighborhood legal serv-
ices programs aside on important cases and jockeying to get Center
cases in front of the Supreme Court before other cases raising simi-
lar issues.29 Not surprisingly, Sparer disliked both Albert and the
direction in which he steered the Center (pp. 75, 139-40).
Although Davis focuses on how Albert and the Center staff
steered a course away from Sparer's original vision of the Center as
an arm of the social movement, the tensions seem inherent in
Sparer's original conception. Accordingly, the split cannot be at-
tributed solely to Albert's personal manner and agenda. From its
outset, the litigation campaign was developed in large part on a the-
oretical level, not deduced from the demands of the NWRO and
other recipient organizations. Sparer developed a list of litigation
objectives that he derived from academic literature, discussion with
other intellectuals, and his own analysis based on his experience at
MFY.30 Although he later criticized lawyers who view themselves
as the "grand strategists" of the movement,31 it is clear that Sparer
was such a strategist himself.
The fact that the agenda was set by the lawyers is not surprising.
The test-case strategy focused on convincing the Supreme Court to
adopt a series of principles. This goal called for an ongoing dia-
logue between the lawyers and the Court. By its nature, the strat-
egy demanded careful planning in choosing the cases that would
provide the contexts for this dialogue and in deciding how far to
push the Court in each case.32 In short, it called for legal analysis
and judgment of the highest order. No individual client or even
client group would have had the expertise to plan such a strategy.
28. Pp. 74-75. Although this depiction would undoubtedly be disputed by some of those
involved in the events, Davis's documentation makes clear that her descriptions of the
Center are based on contemporaneous views.
29. Despite the Center's careful planning about which issues should be presented to the
Court and in which contexts, events seldom went according to plan. As Davis observes, the
Center's "debates concerning welfare rights litigation strategy [were] largely theoretical." P.
76. The problem stemmed from the fact that Sparer's broad promotion of the test-case
model spurred neighborhood legal services offices around the country to jump in and file
cases raising the claims that Sparer had written about. In retrospect, it is clear that the
Center had neither the monopoly on welfare test cases nor the supervisory power over neigh-
borhood offices to enforce a patient and disciplined approach to litigation. See LAWRENCM,
supra note 7, at 46-48.
30. See Edward V. Sparer, Social Welfare Law Testing, PaAc. LAw., Apr. 1966, at 13-31.
31. See Sparer, supra note 8, at 84.
32. See LAWRENcE, supra note 7, at 41 (noting that strategic litigation calls for "a great
deal of centralization and coordination").
[Vol. 93:1401
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More fundamentally, Sparer's belief that the test-case strategy
could work in tandem with the social movement failed to recognize
that the goal of building a grass-roots movement is distinct from
that of pushing the courts to adopt particular legal principles. For
example, welfare recipient groups were most concerned with issues
relating to the adequacy of benefit levels (p. 72). In contrast, the
Center's litigation agenda called for an initial focus on eligibility
and procedural issues. This focus was based on an assessment that
adequacy questions were more ambitious and should be deferred
until the proper groundwork had been laid (p. 72). It also reflected
the idea that the inadequacy of benefit levels could be attacked in-
directly by expanding welfare rolls to create a crisis that would ne-
cessitate a federal takeover of state welfare programs.3 3 Neither
rationale addressed recipients' immediate demands for benefit in-
creases. Sparer's model provided little guidance for resolving such
a conflict between the long-term litigation strategy and the percep-
tions and demands of recipients.34
Any traditional view of lawyer-client relations would dictate
that the desires of the client groups should take precedence.3 5 If so,
what is left of the test-case strategy? A basic premise of the strat-
egy was that a series of cases was needed in order to make the ulti-
mate goals attainable. Upsetting the sequence would jeopardize
the project. If the more ambitious adequacy cases were brought
first and were unsuccessful, the test-case strategy could be left in
shambles. The logic of the test-case strategy called for an incre-
mentalism that was difficult to reconcile with the immediate de-
mands of the social movement.
33. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward developed, and the NWRO adopted, this
"break the bank" strategy. P. 44.
The lack of enthusiasm of the recipient groups for a concentration on eligibility issues
may be attributable to the fact that, by definition, recipients have been found eligible for
benefits. The constituency for expanding eligibility undoubtedly existed but was unorgan-
ized. The recipient groups thus did not reflect the full potential constituency with an interest
in receipt of benefits.
34. Goldberg v. Kelly was one of the few lawsuits that facilitated both goals of establish-
ing precedent and contributing to grass-roots organizing. Goldberg's treatment of welfare
benefits as a property interest rather than a mere gratuity was critical to the right to life
concept. At the same time, the right to a hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits
that Goldberg established provided activist recipients with a measure of protection against
retaliation by welfare workers. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see Ed Sparer, Funda-
mental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the
Critical Legal Studies Movemen 36 STAN. L. REv. 509,562-63 (1984); White, The Paradox of
Lawyering, supra note 4, at 869-71.
35. Paul Tremblay has recently proposed an alternative model under which legal services
attorneys would be permitted to consider the overall interests of their client community in
making decisions concerning legal representation. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Commu-
nity-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. Rnv. 1101 (1990). Under Trem-
blay's model, it would be appropriate for legal services lawyers to exercise independent
judgment as to whether a particular client group's agenda advances the larger interests of the
office's client community. Id. at 1102-04.
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One result of this tension is that the Center has been blamed for
moving both too quickly and too slowly. As Davis recounts, frus-
tration with the Center's cautious approach contributed to the rift
between the Center and the NWRO (pp. 72-73). Concern over the
risk of bringing litigation that would make "bad law" could easily
be interpreted as a lack of responsiveness to the needs and de-
mands of recipients. At the same time, observers of the judicial
system have faulted the Center for rushing the litigation agenda and
not permitting the judiciary to become accustomed to the proposi-
tions that the Center was urging on the courts.36
C. Evaluation of the Test-Case Model
For the reasons described above, the test-case model by its na-
ture tended toward lawyer-dominated decisionmaking. In a brief
concluding chapter, Davis offers a tentative evaluation that recog-
nizes this inevitability. She concludes that the test-case model "may
be ill suited to the poverty law context because it puts lawyers -
whose knowledge of the issues facing poor clients is at best second
hand - at the center of power and decision making in the move-
ment" (p. 143). She also writes that the test-case strategy tended to
"undermine the often fragile organizing power of the grass roots
movement."37
These conclusions converge with the overall thrust of recent ac-
ademic literature on poverty lawyering. Sparer's criticism of Al-
bert's approach resembles the distinction that Gerald L6pez has
drawn between "regnant" lawyering and "rebellious" lawyering.38
L6pez identifies regnant lawyers as those who "consider themselves
the preeminent problem solvers" and who believe that lawyers
should assume leadership in campaigns on behalf of the dis-
empowered.39 In contrast, the rebellious lawyer works at the grass-
roots level and collaborates with disempowered individuals and
groups to assist them in mobilizing to improve their own lives.40
36. Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A
Study in the Uses and Limits of Judicial Process, 58 MINN. L. REv. 211,244-45 (1973). Subse-
quent events, however, make clear that over time the political and judicial climate became
more, not less, hostile to efforts to create a guaranteed minimum income. Had a twenty-year
campaign been launched in 1967, it would have reached its culmination during an era in
which the Supreme Court decidedly unsympathetic to challenges to government policies con-
ceming poverty. See infra note 96. On a political level, the idea of federally guaranteed
minimum income is once again outside the bounds of mainstream discourse.
37. P. 143. Davis does not level this criticism as an assertion that the strategy was there-
fore illegitimate. She acknowledges its accomplishments, as well as pointing out its potential
costs. Pp. 142-43.
38. I.6PrEZ, supra note 4.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Sparer's work does not fit comfortably into L6pez's categories. Sparer's strong belief
that poverty lawyers should defer to organized recipient groups, Sparer, supra note 8, at 86-
87, is characteristic of what L6pez describes as a rebellious approach. Sparer's test-case
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L6pez concludes that regnant lawyering is not only inferior to
rebellious lawyering but harmful to those it seeks to serve:
"[B]reaking away from the regnant idea presents a central chal-
lenge for all those engaged in the modem struggle against subordi-
nation."41 He further explains that regnant lawyering "helps
undermine the very possibility for re-imagined social arrangements
that lies at the heart of any serious effort to take on the status-
quo."42 Other recent scholars have also sounded this theme.
Anthony Alfieri has written that poverty lawyers engaging in habits
of lawyer domination over clients "negate the poor as an historical
class engaged in political struggle, thereby decontextualizing, atom-
izing, and depoliticizing that struggle." 43 He concludes that "the
best hope for combating poverty lies not with lawyers, but with the
poor themselves. It follows that empowering the poor should be
the political object of poverty law."44
The tensions among the lawyers recounted in Brutal Need make
clear that these recent calls for the reorientation of poverty law are
preceded by a long history of debate. In fact, much of the recent
scholarship is reminiscent of criticisms of lawyer domination that
were voiced twenty years ago. By 1971, Sparer was arguing that
"the first step in a grand strategy for lawyers in advancing welfare
rights is to serve, and thereby help build, an independent rights
movement. '45 Around the same time, the Cahns took aim at law
offices, such as the Center, that focused on strategic activity. They
wrote that they had seen
lawyers "for" the poor decide what in their professional collective
wisdom is in the best interest of the poor. Consequently, they draft
legislation; they handle test cases, and for the most part studiously
avoid all contact with those insights which come from neighborhood
offices, from contact with live clients, from group representation or
from structural mechanisms of accountability to the constituency they
ostensibly serve4 6
In fact, for over twenty years, the critics of the test-case ap-
proach have dominated the literature.47 They have painted a
portrait of the test-case lawyer as someone who uses legal represen-
model, however, inevitably tends toward regnant methods because it place lawyers in a cen-
tral role.
41. L6Paz, supra note 4, at 28.
42. Id. at 29.
43. Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 4, at 665.
44. Id.
45. Sparer, supra note 8, at 88.
46. Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Calm, Power to the People or the Profession? - The
Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1040 (1970).
47. See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049 (1970); Com-
ment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970); see also JACK KATZ, POOR
PEoPLE's LAWYERS iN TRANSmON 179-96 (1982). But see DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND
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tation as a means of advancing his or her own social vision while
doing little of real value for clients.48 Brutal Need provides a histor-
ical context that can be used to assess some of the critics' assertions.
I take it as a given that Sparer's test-case strategy could not ulti-
mately be successful without some base of public or political sup-
port for its goals. The right to live is neither apparent on the face of
the Constitution nor obviously implicit in its terms. Because its
declaration would have profound social and financial repercussions
throughout society, courts were unlikely to perform the intellectual
maneuvering necessary to find such an implied right, unless the rea-
soning would resonate with a broad spectrum of the public or with
politically powerful elites.49 The test-case strategy was highly un-
likely to succeed on its own because it was not oriented toward
building the public support or political pressure that was necessary
for its success.50
But the Center was not the exclusive actor in promoting welfare
rights. At the same time that the Center focused on the test-case
strategy, there were hundreds of other poverty law offices across
the country.51 More importantly, there was an active welfare rights
movement among recipients, with momentum provided by the civil
rights movement. Although the civil rights movement avoided wel-
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 317-57 (1988) (defending strategic litigation by poverty law-
yers that could be viewed as manipulation of clients).
48. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1747, 1750-51
(1994) (reviewing LOPEz, supra note 4).
This point has long been a centerpiece of conservative critiques of legal services pro-
grams. See William F. Harvey, LSC - The Greatest Fraud Ever?, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE POOR 81 (Douglas Besharov ed., 1990). In fact, there is a large overlap between pro-
gressive and conservative criticisms of poverty lawyers. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, An
Agenda for Reform, in LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE PooR, supra, at 3,3-5 (objecting to lawyer-
dominated priorities of legal services programs).
49. See LAWRENCE, supra note 7, at 159; ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 336; Greenberg,
supra note 8, at 340-41. Of course, Supreme Court decisions may be controversial. But even
the Court's most controversial decisions are strongly supported by significant segments of the
public. For a fuller discussion of the relationship between public opinion and constitutional
adjudication, see Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993). Friedman explains that "constitutional interpretation is an elaborate discussion be-
tween judges and the body politic." Id. at 653. He argues that though the judiciary is not
always in step with the other branches of government or with public opinion, judges are
constrained by the political system. When they stray too far from public sentiment, pressures
build to bring them back into line. Id. at 679; see also Louis FIsHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIA-
LOGUES 12 (1988) (arguing that the "Court maintains its strength by steering a course that fits
within the permissible limits of public opinion"); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking with a Judi-
cial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205-09 (1992) (arguing that constitutional adjudication
usually follows rather than leads changes in society and that though the Court can reinforce
or facilitate social change, a large gap between the Court and the political branches creates a
risk of backlash).
50. This point is applicable to any ambitious strategy to achieve social change through
litigation. Although it is true that court decisions can have an impact on public opinion, this
influence is usually subtle and gradual. See Friedman, supra note 49, at 668-71.
51. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 99.
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fare issues (p. 120), it built a base of support for the proposition
that society was unfair to minority communities. Even though the
Center may have downplayed its efforts to support recipient or-
ganizing, it worked in a context in which others engaged in organiz-
ing efforts.
The real question, then, is whether there was room for the test-
case strategy, and the lawyer domination that it entailed, as part of
a broader effort to combat poverty. If L6pez and Alfieri are correct
that such a strategy is unhelpful at best and potentially harmful to
efforts to mobilize groups of poor people, one might conclude that
the test-case strategy simply has no place among the approaches
used by poverty lawyers.52
It is not difficult to postulate a number of dynamics that would
render test-case litigation counterproductive. First, small successes
won in litigation may reassure the public that society is responsive
to the grievances of poor people and ,may lead to opposition to fur-
ther demands.53 Second, an agenda set by lawyers may be based on
misperceptions of the true interests and needs of the client commu-
nity. Third, the goals and contours of a test-case agenda will inevi-
tably be shaped by the strength of legal claims and other factors
that bear on the potential for success in the courtroom, rather than
on the needs of clients.54 Fourth, lawyer-dominated litigation strat-
egies may send an implicit message that poor people cannot attain
power by themselves but must rely on the altruism of poverty law-
yers.55 Fifth, poor people who would otherwise work to improve
their own lives may instead forebear, in the belief that improve-
ments will come through litigation 5 6
The practical significance of these objections is impossible to
evaluate in any definitive or objective way. Brutal Need, however,
52. Neither L6pez nor Alfieri rule out the initiation of class action litigation. Rather,
they view lawsuits as appropriate when they grow out of an organizing effort. See LOiprz,
supra note 4, at 32; Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 4, at 689 n.186.
53. All strategies based on incremental change pose this risk.
54. White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 4, at 757 (discussing the "risk that litigation
will co-opt social mobilization" by shaping and limiting the demands of subordinated
groups)..
55. Alfieri has argued that the lawyer-client relationship places the poor person in the
role of the passive client who is dependent upon the lawyer. See Alfieri, Antinomies, supra
note 4, at 674. L6pez suggests this argument in his assertion that regnant lawyers dispense
rights in the same manner in which the state dispenses benefits. See LOPEZ, supra note 4, at
75.
56. Lucie White has noted that "[1]itigation may falsely raise in the community the expec-
tation that appeal to 'the law' can somehow give it power. Thus the community may put its
energy into litigation instead of the much more difficult work of organizing itself." White, To
Learn and Teach, supra note 4, at 742; see also KATZ, supra note 47, at 102.
Additionally, when successful, law reform litigation may yield consequences that were
never anticipated or desired by those who fied the case. See ROSENBERO, supra note 16, at
338-39; Peter Margulies, "Who are You to Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation Re-
garding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213, 231-39 (1990).
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does not make out a strong case that the social movement could
have accomplished more had the Center not undertaken the test-
case strategy. The 1960s was one of the rare periods in American
history in which many poor people mobilized to assert and expand
their rights collectively. 57 The atmosphere of protest fostered by
the civil rights movement, urban unrest, and opposition to the Viet-
nam War, together with the economic prosperity of the era, created
an extremely favorable climate for poor communities to demand a
greater share of society's resources.58 Nonetheless, all the organiz-
ing strategies described in Brutal Need either failed immediately or
yielded only short-lived successes. Although the special needs
grant campaign brought short-term organizing successes, these suc-
cesses proved impossible to sustain. When the State of New York
responded by eliminating special needs grants in 1968, the welfare
rights groups "had little to offer recipients" and a succession of
NWRO organizing strategies failed.59
It is difficult to believe that these failures could have been re-
versed had the Center refocused its efforts on organizing. The fail-
ure of the NWRO stands as a testament to the enormous barriers to
organizing poor people around the issue of welfare rights. More-
over, the influence of the NWRO was overwhelmed by a backlash
in public opinion that began with the elections of Ronald Reagan as
governor of California and Richard Nixon as President. The forces
that fueled this tide were far too powerful to be stopped by a hand-
ful of poverty lawyers.60 In short, the ultimate failure of the welfare
rights movement cannot be laid at the doorstep of Lee Albert or
the Center staff.61
57. See PIvEN & CLOWARD, supra note 6, at 6-14.
58. See generally id. at 264-74 (discussing the rise of the welfare rights movement).
59. Pp. 53-54; see also JOEL HANDLER, SocIAL MovasmENs AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM
159 (1978) ("When the special grants were sharply reduced, welfare rights organizations
withered.").
60. Poverty lawyers did, however, play a role in creating the backlash. By the end of the
1960s, the victories of the test-case model and the work of the NWRO had resulted in the
expansion of welfare rolls that created budget crises in many states. The backlash grew out
of the realization that the middle class would be called upon to pay for the new welfare rights
in the form of increased taxes. See Koarz & KoTz, supra note 6, at 285-87 (describing the
growing public hostility to welfare).
61. Supporters of the movement have disagreed over the lessons about organizing strate-
gies to be drawn from the collapse of the NWRO. Piven and Cloward argue that the move-
ment failed to achieve its potential because its leadership became preoccupied with winning
acceptance in mainstream political circles instead of maintaining its early emphasis on social
protest. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 6, at 324-31. Sparer drew the opposite conclusion
and argued that any future strategy should focus on forging alliances with other groups and
eschewing divisive tactics. See Edward Sparer, Discussions, Ten Years of Legal Services for
the Poor, in A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTnPOVERTY PRoGRAMs 324, 324-27 (Robert H.
Haveman ed., 1977); Edward V. Sparer, Legal Services and Social Change: The Uneasy
Question and the Missing Perspective, 1976-77 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 58.
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In fact, it appears more likely that the test-case strategy had lit-
tle role in creating or destroying the social movement. Instead,
Sparer and his colleagues rode the crest of a wave. When the social
movement was powerful and the impulse in society for reform was
strong, the test cases flourished. When the movement ebbed and a
backlash set in, the strategy foundered.
Given its marginal impact on recipient organizing, the benefits
of the test-case strategy appear to outweigh its downsides.
Although the Supreme Court rejected the right to live thesis, the
accomplishments of the strategy were remarkable. When Sparer
published his agenda in 1965 and 1966, most of his objectives ap-
peared utopian. Sparer's list included goals such as the elimination
of residency laws, "man in the house" rules that disqualified
mothers who cohabitated with men, and midnight raids to check up
on recipients.62 It also included the establishment of due process
protections and a right to adequate benefits.63 At the time Sparer
articulated his agenda, no federal court had ever invalidated a state
welfare practice or policy. The accomplishment of Sparer's agenda
would require sweeping changes in the legal status of welfare.
By 1971, the Supreme Court had upheld the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts to review challenges to state welfare policies,64 struck
down residency laws,65 invalidated man in the house rules, 66 and
found that determinations to terminate welfare benefits are subject
to the requirements of due process. 67 The Supreme Court's deci-
sion striking down man in the house rules alone made 500,000 chil-
dren eligible for public assistance (p. 68). Moreover, during the
1970s, poverty lawyers were able to use the principles established
by these Supreme Court cases to challenge many other restrictive
eligibility rules and unfair procedures. 68
It is hard to imagine that a campaign of picketing, demonstra-
tions, and sit-ins could have accomplished all that was achieved by
the Center through litigation.69 Although the prospects for using
litigation to achieve social change may ultimately be dependent
upon larger political forces, litigation can yield benefits that could
not be obtained through the political system alone. For example, it
is unlikely that recipient groups had the political clout to persuade
62. Sparer, supra note 30, at 15-18.
63. ld. at 28-30.
64. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968).
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
66. King, 392 U.S. at 333-34.
67. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).
68. In* this respect, King and Goldberg proved to be particularly important. See Sard,
supra note 8, at 375-80.
69. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Discussions, Ten Years of Legal Services for the Poor, in A
DECADE OF FEDERAL AmrpovmRTY PROGRAMS, supra note 61, at 315, 315-16.
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forty state legislatures to repeal the public assistance residency re-
quirements that the Court struck down in Shapiro v. Thompson.70
Most important, the strategy cashed in on the favorable political
and judicial climate of the times in order to establish legal princi-
ples that have endured long after the political tide has ebbed.
Most of these principles are now under attack. The new Repub-
lican majority in Congress is seeking to end the "entitlement" status
of the basic federal cash assistance programs.71 The proposed "Per-
sonal Responsibility Act" 72 would revive the use eligibility restric-
tions to control the "morality" of public assistance recipients.73 The
Supreme Court has even come close to reconsidering the issue of
residency requirements for receipt of assistance.74 This onslaught
was proceeded by a period of erosion in which the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) granted states dozens of waiv-
ers exempting their programs from federal requirements designed
to assure fair treatment of recipients.75
The current assault on the victories of the Center underscores
the limitations of litigation as a tool for achieving fundamental and
enduring change in society. At the same time, it also calls for re-
70. 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
71. See Robert Pear, Welfare Debate Will Re-Examine Old Assumptions, N.Y. TImps, Jan.
2, 1995, at Al, A9.
72. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
73. The bill begins with a statement that it is the "sense of the Congress" that "marriage
is the foundation of a successful society." H.R. 4,104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 100 (1995); see also
H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995) (denying aid to children whose paternity has not
been established); H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 105 (1995) (bar on aid to children born to
unmarried mothers under 18 years of age, removable only by marriage of mother to the
father of the child); H.R. 4,104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1995) (bar on aid to children born to
AFDC recipients); H.R. 4,104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1995) (state option to withhold aid to
children born to unmarried mothers between the ages of 18 and 20). Proponents of these
measures have argued for the revival of shame and stigma as a response to the rise in single
motherhood. See, eg., Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Victorians Get a Bad Rap, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 9, 1995, at A15.
74. Anderson v. Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059 (1995) (dismissing as moot appeal from decision
striking down restriction on public assistance benefits based on residency). The issue is likely
to return to the Court's docket as residency requirements are making a comeback in many
states. Se4 e.g., Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 902
(1994); Jones v. Milwaukee County, 485 N.W2d 21 (Wis. 1992); see also Stephen Loffredo,
"If You Ain't Got the Do Re Me": The Commerce Clause and State Residence Restrictions on
Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 147 (1993).
75. See generally Susan Bennett & Kathleen A. Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers
and Welfare "Reform," 26 MiCH. J.L. REF R 741, 743-44 (1994) (discussing HHS proce-
dures for granting waiver applications); Lucy A. Williams, The Abuse of Section 1115 Waiv-
ers: Welfare Reform in Search of a Standard, 12 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 8 (1994) (arguing that
many state waiver requests should not be granted because they are not limited research
projects as required by the statutory grant of authority to waive federal requirements); Lucy
A. Williams, The Ideology of Divisiom Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102
YALE L.J. 719 (1992) (discussing the content of recent demonstration projects approved by
H1-1S). HHS's willingness to waive basic federal eligibility standards could be viewed as a de




newed appreciation of the accomplishments of the test-case strat-
egy. The threat of a return to an era when states and administrators
punitively manipulated eligibility for public assistance so as to stig-
matize and terrorize recipients,76 makes the accomplishments of
Sparer and his colleagues appear all the more remarkable.
I do not offer these conclusions as an endorsement of everything
that the Center did. In particular, a more open approach to recipi-
ent groups and neighborhood legal services offices may have
strengthened its efforts. But the criticisms of the lawyer domination
inherent in test-case strategies voiced by Davis and more fully de-
veloped in scholarly writing seem overstated. Although the polit-
ical and judicial context may not always be right for such a strategy,
it suffers from no inherent flaw that will always make it
inappropriate.
II. TBE LEGACY OF THE 1960s
A. "Law Reform" in the Contemporary Era
The work of Sparer and his colleagues has had an enduring im-
pact on the way that poverty law is practiced in this country. 7 As a
result of their work, poverty lawyers no longer view their role as
functionaries of the justice system, limited to the goal of providing
equal access. 78 Instead, the core insight of Sparer and his contem-
poraries - the idea that poverty law offices are or should be en-
gaged in an effort to reform and improve political and social
institutions that affect poor communities - has become deeply in-
grained in the culture of poverty law practice.79 Rather than exclu-
76. See MInI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIvxs OF POOR WOMEN 318-29 (1988)
(discussing exclusionary and punitive policies and practices that characterized the AFDC
program prior to the 1960s); WINWRED BEL, Am TO DEPENDENT CnIDREN (1965) (same);
FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RicHARD A. CLOWAmR, REGULATING THE POOR: Tmx FUNc-ONS
OF PUBLIC WELFARE 128-30 (2d ed. 1993) (same).
77. Apparently, at one point Ms. Davis was considering expanding the scope of her pro-
ject to include a discussion of current law reform efforts by poverty lawyers. She interviewed
me on that subject while I was a staff attorney at The Legal Aid Society in New York City.
Although Davis writes about the 1960s from a historical perspective, she is a participant
in the current debate about welfare. As an attorney for the NOW Legal Defense Fund,
Davis has worked to mobilize feminists to focus on poverty issues. See Martha Davis,
Women on the Move: Civilian Responses to the War on Poor Women, 21 Soc. JusT. 102
(1994). Davis's perceptive account of the 1960s suggests that her evaluation of the contem-
porary work would have been well worth reading.
78. The arguments used to support continued federal funding for legal services, however,
have reverted to the rhetoric of equal access to the justice system., Thus, the Legal Services
Corporation places a heavy emphasis on the goal of access to legal counsel. See KATZ, supra
note 47, at 170.
79. See iU at 105-06, 178. In part, the continuation of law reform work is due to an
expanded view of what it means to provide access to competent counsel. See generally Marie
A. Failinger & Larry May, Litigating Against Poverty: Legal Services and Group Representa-
tion, 45 Omo ST. LJ. 1, 34-39 (1984) (arguing that law reform work'is consistent with the
goal of providing equal access to the justice system because individual clients have an interest
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sively providing service to individuals, most programs strive to
engage in some active efforts that benefit poor people in the com-
munity who are not directly represented. Furthermore, Sparer's
test-case strategy has created a vibrant tradition of using litigation
as a tool in this effort.
Nonetheless, much has changed since the 1960s. In reading Bru-
tal Need, one is struck by how differently poverty lawyers today
perceive their role. Davis depicts an era in which poverty lawyers
possessed the energy and optimism that accompanies a new enter-
prise. Because the idea of using legal representation as a means of
fighting poverty was new, the debates about strategy were uncon-
strained by preexisting routines. In addition, these debates were
passionate because the participants believed that the potential for
fundamental social change existed. At a time when welfare recipi-
ents were staging so many acts of social protest that the New York
City Welfare Department had to establish a "war room" (p. 53), a
focus on recipient organizing held out the promise of mobilizing
hundreds of thousands of welfare recipients. Correspondingly, the
groundbreaking decisions of the Warren Court made it possible to
think in terms of using litigation to achieve major breakthroughs.
Few contemporary poverty lawyers experienced these heady
early days of the legal services program. Most have come of age in
an era in which the possibilities for broad-based social change ap-
pear to be far more limited. As a result, most poverty lawyers are
skeptical of the original core premise of the legal services program
- that legal representation can play a major role in ending poverty
in America. Although committed to using legal representation as a
means of fighting poverty, most contemporary lawyers have much
more sober assessments of its potential.
Furthermore, contemporary poverty lawyers work in a context
of shrinking resources and contracting programs.8 0 After twelve
in using the justice system to reform institutions and because law reform efforts by legal
services attorneys are analogous to services provided by private counsel).
Although the idea that lawyers should work to alleviate poverty is no longer seriously
debated by poverty lawyers, challenges periodically arise from other quarters. See Marshall
Breger, Legal Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C. L. REV. 282 (1982). The
most recent challenge was the Gramm Amendment, which would have prohibited programs
that receive funds from the Legal Services Corporation from using those funds to "file or
maintain in any Federal or State court any action that would have the effect of nullifying any
provision of Federal or State law which seeks to reform welfare." 140 CoNo. REc. S9402
(daily ed. July 21, 1994). The Senate only narrowly defeated this legislation with a 56-44
vote. Id. at S9439. The vote on the Gramm Amendment is a sharp reminder of the fact that
federal funding for legal services cannot be taken for granted. This issue is certain to resur-
face in the 104th Congress. See William Mellor, Want Welfare Reform? First Fight Legal
Services Corporation, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at A13.
80. See LuBAN, supra note 47, at 241-42. Luban reports that by 1983 the number of
poverty law offices funded by the Legal Services Corporation had dropped by 25% and that
programs had abandoned whole areas of practice in which they previously had engaged. Id.;
see also igran W. Eldred & Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer's Duty of Public Service: More
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years of executive branch hostility to federal funding for legal serv-
ices, the resources that legal services programs can bring to bear on
problems have shrunk,' and the resources available for law reform
work have been hit particularly hard. Shortages of funds have
forced programs to choose between closing small neighborhood of-
fices or laying off staff8' - a dilemma never envisioned by the pro-
ponents of decentralized neighborhood offices in the 1960s.82 The
results of the 1994 mid-term election assure that legal services pro-
grams will once again be fighting to survive. Indeed, depending on
the outcome of this struggle, the practices discussed in this section
may soon no longer be 'contemporary.'
Recent efforts at law reform reflect the more limited goals of
poverty lawyers. Legal services lawyers no longer spend time plan-
ning long-term strategies for ending poverty. Instead, their strate-
gies typically focus on improving particular government agencies or
programs in significant, but limited, ways. Often strategies are
solely defensive - designed to stop cutbacks in social welfare pro-
grams.83 In the 1960s, the lawyers described in Brutal Need would
than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 367,371 nn.14 & 15 (1993-94) (describing cuts in funding
for the Legal Services Corporation). These problems have continued. The current budget of
the Legal Services Corporation would have to be more than doubled in order to attain the
same ratio of one lawyer for every 10,000 poor people that existed in 1981. William L Dean,
The Legal Services Corp., N.Y.LJ., Sept. 2, 1994, at 3.
Allen Redlich has questioned the proposition that legal services programs are in dire
financial straits. See Allen Redlich, A New Legal Services Agenda, 57 ALB. L. Rnv. 169,176-
79 (1993). He points out that the statistics commonly offered to show the severity of funding
cuts all use 1981 as a reference point, which was the highwater mark of legal services funding.
Id. Although there is some validity to this point, it overlooks the fact that funding trends
create a dynamic of their own. Thus, even if absolute levels of funding were lower in the
1970s than they are today, the programs operated in a context of continuous growth. In
contrast, today they operate in the context of decline and retrenchment, making it difficult
for attorneys to think in terms of expansion and new projects. Simply put, the same amount
of money may seem like a large sum or a small one, depending on one's starting point. Fi-
nally, a true comparison of funding levels would have to adjust for inflation and take into
account the increase in the number of poor people who form the client base for legal services
programs.
81. Personal communication with Catherine Carr, Supervising Attorney, Community
Legal Services (CLS), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The attorney staff of CLS is slightly over
half the size today that it was fifteen years ago. Neighborhood offices have been closed in
order to avoid even greater reductions.
Some programs have managed to replace dwindling federal aid with grants from state or
local governments. Such grant programs are usually dedicated to funding representation for
specific purposes. See Michael B. Glomb & Jane Hardin, Alternative Funding Mechanisms
for Legal Services Providers, 25 CIEARINGHousE REv. 484 (1991). Reliance on such pro-
grams raises the danger that state and local government will be able to exert a significant
influence on the activities of legal services programs, thereby compromising the ability of
such programs to challenge actions by these levels of government.
82. See Daniel H. Lowenstein & Michael . Waggoner, Note, Neighborhood Law Offices:
The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805 (1967).
83. The Center for Social Welfare Policy and Law has tracked over fifty cases filed by
legal services programs challenging cutbacks in public assistance programs that have been
active during a recent three-year period. See CENTER FOR SOCIAL WELFARE PoLic" & LAW,
WELFARE CUTBACK LrIGAT[ON 1991-1994 (July 1994).
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probably have dismissed these efforts as band-aid work on a large
scale because such efforts seek to make being poor less harsh but
do not seek to end poverty.84
Litigation still figures prominently as a tool of law reform
work.85 Law reform litigation today, however, frequently bears
only outward similarities to Sparer's test-case strategy. Although
contemporary law reform litigation may have goals apart from the
particular relief sought, such as building public awareness of a prob-
lem, putting pressure on'government officials to change policies, or
even supporting sympathetic government officials who are con-
strained by other elements within the government,86 poverty law-
yers rarely bring cases for the purpose of urging the courts to adopt
principles that will be of use in the future.
The reasons for this shift are obvious - the federal courts have
become inhospitable to claims of poor people. Poverty litigators in
federal court are confronted with a battery of jurisdictional and
other technical defenses,87 the judiciary's deference to administra-
tive agencies, 88 and a judiciary appointed by Republican presidents
committed to making sure that the judicial activism of the 1960s
does not recur.89 Although poverty lawyers have been urged to
refocus their efforts on state courts,90 state courts have traditionally
been reluctant to issue decisions or order relief that has the poten-
84. As early as 1970 Sparer complained about poverty lawyers who function as "technical
aide[s] who smooth[ ] the functioning of an inadequate system and thereby help[ ] perpetuate
it." Sparer, supra note 8, at 84.
85. Although there can be no doubt that litigation continues to play a major role in pov-
erty lawyers' strategies, it is difficult to generalize about how much poverty lawyers rely on
litigation to the exclusion of other advocacy methods. See infra note 131. In my own experi-
ence, poverty lawyers frequently engaged in informal lobbying and negotiation with govern-
ment officials. Poverty lawyers also worked in coalitions with other advocacy organizations
and attempted to use the media to educate the public. Sometimes lawyers used class action
litigation as the sole means to address a problem, and sometimes they used such lawsuits as
the focal point for a broader effort.
86. Cf. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 209-22 (discussing common indirect purposes of law
reform litigation); SuzAND GLUCK MEZEY, No LONGER DIsAaLnD 147-48 (1988) (discuss-
ing the role of litigation as a catalyst for other actors in the political process); White, To
Learn and Teach, supra note 4, at 699, 758-60.
87. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); Grant v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 1332 (3d
Cir. 1993); Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1992).
88. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89. See Robert D. Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President
Bush, 76 JUDICATURE 298, 301 (1993). By 1993, 70% of active federal district court judges
were appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Patricia M. Wald, Ten Admonitions for
Legal Services Advocates Contemplating Federal Litigation, 27 CLEARJNGHOUSE REV. 11, 16-
17 (May 1993). Although this percentage has obviously declined, any shift in the outlook of
the federal judiciary will be gradual. See Stephan Labaton, President's Judicial Appoint-
ments: Diverse, but Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 1994, at A15.
90. Adam Cohen, Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the
Right to Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615 (1989); Sard, supra note 8, at 381-82, 388.
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tial to cause confrontation with the other branches of government.9'
Although poverty lawyers have had some recent successes at the
state level,92 state courts appear as attractive forums only by com-
parison with their federal counterparts.
As a result of this judicial climate, when poverty lawyers bring
litigation, they often structure their cases differently from the way
Sparer and his colleagues did. The poverty lawyers of the 1960s
hoped for victories predicated on broad legal grounds so as to es-
tablish helpful precedent. Judge Patricia Wald has written that as
poverty lawyers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, she and her col-
leagues "felt confident ... raising constitutional issues freely -
almost proffigately .... -"93 Moreover, they wanted their cases to go
to the Court, both because they viewed the Court as a more recep-
tive forum than many lower courts and because they sought to es-
tablish nationally binding precedent.94
In contrast, poverty lawyers today are most successful when
they shape their cases to avoid creating broad precedents that
would make many lower court judges uncomfortable and would in-
crease the likelihood of Supreme Court review.95 Because the
lower federal courts have been more receptive to claims by poor
people than the Supreme Court in recent years,96 the most secure
victories are those predicated on narrow grounds that are unlikely
to result in Supreme Court review. Decisions based on factual find-
91. Cf. Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1105,1127-28 (1977) (argu-
ing that state judges are more susceptible to majoritarian political pressures than federal
judges).
92. See, e.g., Abbott ex rel Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (NJ. 1994); Jiggetts v. Grinker,
553 N.E.2d 570 (N.Y. 1990); McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987). But see Mitchell v.
Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198 (Minn. 1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 902 (1994); Savage v. Aronson,
571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990); Bullock v. Whiteman, 865 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1993); Hope v. Perales,
634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994).
93. Wald, supra note 89, at 12.
94. See, eg., pp. 100-01.
95. Gary Blasi has described how a hostile judicial climate led poverty lawyers in Los
Angeles to avoid an ambitious broad-based challenge to the administration of the county's
general assistance program. See Gary L. Blasi, Litigation Strategies for Addressing Bureau-
cratic Disentitlement, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. C~rOE 591 (1987-88). Instead, the attor-
neys opted for a series of six narrower lawsuits. Id. at 596 & n.33.
96. For the past fifteen years, Supreme Court decisions on public benefits issues have
mostly taken the form of reversals of lower court decisions in favor of poor people. See; e.g.,
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990) (reversing a Fourth Circuit decision striking down a
restrictive AFDC rule); Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83 (1990) (reversing a Tenth Circuit
decision striking down a restrictive rule in the Supplemental Security Income program); Lyng
v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (reversing a lower court decision invalidat-
ing a restriction on food stamp eligibility); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (reversing a
district court decision striking down a restrictive AFDC statute); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S.
137 (1987) (reversing a decision of the Ninth Circuit striking down a restrictive rule in the
administration of disability benefit programs); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987) (revers-
ing a Fourth Circuit decision invalidating a restrictive AFDC rule).
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ings are the most secure from appellate review.97 Thus, poverty
lawyers today are. most likely to prevail when they bring cases that
are designed to pose narrow legal or factual questions and that con-
sequently will be of limited use as precedent in the future.
Many poverty lawyers have a greater realization than their
predecessors of the limitations of litigation that results in a broad
declaration of rights.98 Although litigation over formal administra-
tive rules and standards can be productive, such lawsuits do little to
address the ingrained institutional problems in many social welfare
agencies. Social welfare agencies frequently engage in tactics of
"bureaucratic disentitlement" that deny recipients benefits due to
them under the formal eligibility criteria.99 This problem has grown
more acute as twenty years of lawsuits have educated administra-
tors of social welfare agencies and made them more sophisticated
defendants. Regulations and policy statements only infrequently
state propositions that are baldly illegal. Instead, policy statements
are often couched in qualified or ambiguous terms that protect
them from facial challenge but that nonetheless convey unlawful
policies to agency personnel familiar with deciphering the intended
meanings.' 00
Litigation that focuses on the actual practices of social welfare
agencies, as opposed to their professed policies, may not run afoul
of the judiciary's reluctance to recognize new entitlements, but it
contains its own difficulties. Legal challengers must present proof
of systematic practices in order to rebut the inevitable defense that
a few mistakes do not justify broad relief.101 Litigation of such fact-
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (making factual findings reviewable on clearly erroneous
standard).
98. These limitations have become apparent in other contexts as well. See HAnDLER,
supra note 59; ROSENBERG, supra note 16; Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead- Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Socy. REv. 95 (1974).
99. See Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58 Soc.
SERV. REv. 3 (1984); see also PvEN & C-ow~mm, supra note 76, at 374-78 (describing the
administrative strategy of making the application process more difficult as a means of cutting
public assistance rolls in a way that would survive court challenges); Anna Lou Dehavenon,
Charles Dickens Meets Franz Kafka: The Maladministration of New York City's Public
Assistance Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 231 (1989-90) (describing how
thousands of public assistance cases in New York City are closed for administrative reasons
unrelated to the recipients' actual eligibility); Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to
Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U.
Rav. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457, 524-33 (1987-88) (describing tactics of bureaucratic disentitle-
ment employed by the County of Los Angeles in the administration of its general assistance
program).
100. See Hyatt v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 329, 234 (4th Cir. 1990); Dixon v. Sullivan, 792 F.
Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) affd sub nom, Dixon v. Shalala, 1995 WL 231487, at *1 (2d Cir.
Apr. 19, 1995).
101. See In re Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826,850-51 (3d Cir. 1990); Hyatt 899 F.2d at 335; Floyd v.
Bowen, 833 F.2d 529,532 (5th Cir. 1987); Morel v. Giuliani, No. 94 Civ. 4415, 1995 WL 5902,
*10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4,1995); Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); McQueen
v. Grinker, 551 N.Y.S.2d 493 (App. Div. 1990).
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intensive issues requires extensive discovery and may also require
expert witnesses and statistical studies. Few poverty law offices can
afford to litigate these kinds of cases or are equipped to process
large volumes of documents and depositions. 0 2 Additionally, rem-
edies in such cases are frequently complex, and courts may recoil
from the degree of entanglement that they entail.10 3 When such
remedies are ordered, they are difficult to monitor and require an
ongoing commitment of resources. 10 4
Despite a hostile judiciary, shrinking budgets, and more difficult
legal claims, poverty lawyers have managed to eke out a surprising
number of successes over the past fifteen years. Although a full
discussion would not be appropriate here, the efforts of poverty
lawyers to combat the Reagan administration's constriction of the
disability benefit programs of the Social Security Act provide a
good example of successful law reform strategies in the modem
area.
During the early 1980s, the administration announced its inten-
tion to shrink the disability rolls by tightening eligibility standards
for new applicants and by reviewing the cases of benefit recipients
under these stricter standards.105 The effort was undertaken
through both the promulgation of restrictive rules' o and techniques
of bureaucratic disentitlement in which the rules actually applied by
the Social Security Administration were stricter than the publicly
stated standards. 10 7 As a result of these efforts, the allowance rates
for initial claims dropped from forty-six percent in 1977 to a low of
twenty-nine percent in 1982.108 In addition, approximately 500,000
benefit recipients were purged from the rolls on the ground that
they were no longer disabled.10 9
Poverty lawyers responded to these developments with a bar-
rage of class action lawsuits. In general, lawyers crafted these law-
102. Cf HANDLER, supra note 59, at 31. Legal services programs have been slow to
adapt to the institutional demands of such cases. For example, few legal services offices have
paraprofessionals who perform litigation support functions.
103. Id. at 24; Wald, supra note 89, at 13.
104. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 24; see, ag., McCain v. Dinkins, 639 N.E.2d 1132 (N.Y.
1994).
105. See MEzEY, supra note 86, at 59-65, 72-73, 86-87.
106. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (upholding regulations requiring
disability adjudicators to adhere to fixed criteria in making vocational assessments).
107. Suzanne Mezey has attributed the decline in disability awards in this period princi-
pally to a "harsher adjudicative climate" rather than to new regulations. MEzEY, supra note
86, at 72-73.
108. HousE Comm. ON WAYS AND MEANS, OVERVIEW OF ENTrLEmENT PROGRAms 64
(tbl. 9) (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter COMMrrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, Tnm GREEN
BOOK].




suits narrowly to focus on specific administrative policies or
practices. 110 Few, if any, of these cases individually held out the
potential for fundamental change. For example, the administration
could easily respond to a successful lawsuit focused on one aspect
of the disability determination process by tightening standards at
another point. The sheer number of lawsuits, however, and the
wide variety of issues that they addressed created an atmosphere in
which the Social Security Administration was under siege.1 1 Grad-
ually, the agency lost its ability to control the flow of events, and
allowance rates drifted upward. 12 The lawsuits also served as a cat-
alyst for congressional action. They led Congress to pass the Disa-
bility Benefits Reform Act of 1984,1 3 which put an end to a
number of the Administration's harshest policies.
Although there are still many problems with the administration
of the disability programs, the Reagan administration's assault on
the programs must, in large measure, be counted a failure.114 The
litigation over the disability programs shows that strategic litigation
can still be a productive strategy, but that to be successful, poverty
lawyers cannot ordinarily rely on a single class action lawsuit to es-
tablish broad principles that bring about sweeping change.
B. Is Poverty Law in Crisis?
As noted above," 5 a number of legal scholars have taken a dif-
ferent view of poverty lawyers' track record. For these scholars, the
legacy of the test-case model has principally been negative - an
overemphasis on lawyer-dominated litigation at the expense of mo-
bilizing poor communities. These scholars see not only a crisis of
110. MnEzE, supra note 86, at 19.
111. Although litigation formed the centerpiece of advocacy efforts on this issue, it was
by no means the only activity undertaken by poverty lawyers. Lawyers lobbied Congress,
engaged in public relations efforts, and worked with other advocacy groups. See id. at 154-57.
112. COMMrrrEE ON WAYS AND MEANs, Tm GRENn BooK, supra note 108, at 64 (tbl.
9).
113. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.); see also MEzEo, supra note 86, at 3, 176-77.
114. TWo unique factors contributed to the success of litigation in this area. First, because
federal judges review individual denials of disability benefits, they are familiar with disability
benefit cases, and the cutbacks had an immediate impact on judicial dockets. See Matthew
Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of
Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YAL LJ. 801, 817, n.64 (1990). Second,
because social security disability insurance benefits are funded by payroll taxes and are only
available to individuals with a recent work history, claimants appear more sympathetic to
federal judges than other groups of applicants for or recipients of public benefits. Cf. Jacobus
tenBroek & Richard B. Wilson, Public Assistance and Social Insurance - A Normative Eval-
uation, 1 UCLA L. REv. 237,239-51 (1954) (discussing differences in attitudes toward social
insurance programs and means-tested benefit programs).
115. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
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poverty but a crisis of poverty law. Edgar Cahn, for example, has
recently written:
There is a fundamental need to "reinvent poverty law." If we are to
be candid, our mission, whether equal justice or empowerment, can-
not be achieved through linear expansion in the ranks of lawyers serv-
ing the poor. Without a more fundamental change, legal services for
the poor will remain mired, fighting valiantly, winning more than los-
ing - but unable to make major inroads on poverty and
disenfranchisement. 116
Anthony Alfieri has also voiced this view. He has written that
"[p]overty law is a field in crisis, its practice failing to alleviate
either economic impoverishment or sociolegal powerlessness.""u 7
Paul Tremblay has observed that these recent alarms are but the
latest salvo in a long history of criticism of poverty lawyers by pro-
gressive academics. As Tremblay notes, "Poverty lawyers have
been described as oppressors, as domineering, as unreflective, as
poor lawyers, or as unfeeling bureaucrats.""18
These pronouncements of a crisis flow from the premise that
because poverty has expanded and intensified over the past twenty
years,"19 poverty lawyers must be doing something terribly wrong.
These claims are based on a continued faith that poverty lawyers
can have a major impact on reducing or ending poverty in
America. 120 According to these critics, the accomplishments of
poverty lawyers in expanding access to public benefits or staving off
potentially devastating cutbacks in public benefits are of little con-
sequence because they do not have the potential to bring about an
end to poverty.
I will address two of the most recurrent criticisms made by these
theorists. First, they argue that poverty lawyers should dramatically
refocus their efforts on building and nurturing grass-roots social
protest movements. 21 Second, they argue that the traditional rela-
tionships between poverty lawyers and their clients contribute to
the disempowerment of poor clients and thereby bolster the status
quo.'2
116. Edgar S. Calm, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE LJ. 2133, 2134 (1994).
117. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 4, at 775.
118. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 4, at 949; see Redlich, supra note 80, at
170-72; Ronald Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Duty to the Poor, 19 HoFSTRA L. Rv. 885,
1031-40 (1991).
119. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. Rv.
1277, 1316-19 (1993).
120. See eg., Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 4, at 711 ("The goal of poverty law should,
indeed, must be the abolition of poverty.").
121. See L6PEz, supra note 4, at 335-36; Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 4, at 664,704-11.
122. L6paz, supra note 4, at 44-56; Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 4, at 683-87; Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 4, at 2118-23.
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brning first to the issue of grass-roots organizing, I agree with
the critics that the attainment of political strength provides the best,
and perhaps the only, prospect for the lasting and fundamental
transformation of poor communities. 123 The crisis theorists, how-
ever, overstate the potential impact of lawyers to promote such
change through a renewed emphasis on grass-roots organizing. Just
as the events of the 1960s demonstrated that lawyers could not de-
feat poverty in the courtroom, they also demonstrated that the
long-term attainment of power through grass-roots protest by poor
communities is far easier to describe than to accomplish.
The potential for poverty lawyers serving as advisors to a social
protest movement has dimmed since the 1960s. The NWRO dis-
integrated in the mid-1970s, and no comparable group has taken its
place.1 4 As noted above, even the welfare rights movement of the
1960s - the pinnacle of social protest by welfare recipients - was
fragile and fleeting. Organizing welfare recipients has become only
more difficult since then. The decline of public assistance benefit
levels' 25 and the multiplication of bureaucratic requirements to
maintain eligibility 26 have increased the degree to which public
assistance recipients must engage in a daily struggle for survival.
Moreover, it is difficult for public assistance recipients to rally be-
hind a set of demands and to forge alliances at a time when they are
demonized in mainstream political debate.127 Although group ac-
tion by welfare recipients has not completely disappeared, it has
become the exception rather than the norm.'2
Poverty lawyers can and should be supportive of poor people's
organizations when they exist. Perhaps they have not been sup-
Although these are two of the most prominent themes in recent literature, they are not
the only critiques of poverty law practice. For example, a number of scholars have argued
that law reform efforts of poverty lawyers have made public benefit programs more legalistic
and bureaucratic without improving them. See, e.g., KATz, supra note 47, at 179-96; William
H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. Rlv. 1, 35-36 (1985);
William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE LJ. 1198
(1983). There have been a number of responses to this line of criticism. See, ag., Joel F.
Handler, Discretion in Social Welfare: The Uneasy Position of the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J.
1270 (1983); Sparer, supra note 34, at 560-67.
Moreover, although I have attempted to distill a number of recurrent themes, recent crit-
ics of poverty law practice do not agree on all points, and there are significant differences in
the focus and emphasis of their work.
123. See Loffredo, supra note 119, at 1323-28.
124. HANDLER, supra note 59, at 161; KA'rz, supra note 47, at 103.
125. Since 1970 benefit levels have declined by an average of 45%. See CoMMrrEE ON
WAYS AND MEANs, THE GREN Boor, supra note 108, at 666-67 (tbl. 14).
126. See Dehavenon, supra note 99, at 235-50.
127. See Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GEo. L.J. 1961, 1961-66 (1993); Lucy A. Williams, supra note 75 at 34-35 (1994).
128. A number of recipient organizations do exist. For example, the National Welfare
Rights Union was formed in 1987. See Marian Kramer, Remarks on the National Welfare
Rights Union, 21 Soc. Jusr. 9 (1994); see also Davis, supra note 77.
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portive enough. But the forces that enable social movements to
form and gain power are driven by trends that poverty lawyers can-
not shape. Lawyers cannot create organizations out of whole cloth,
and they cannot create a powerful social protest movement where
none exists.129 It may be that a time will come when poor commu-
nities mobilize to force a redistribution of social resources. Per-
haps, the ferocity of recent attacks on welfare recipients will lead in
time to a new era of activism. I suspect, however, that such activism
would take different forms and would focus on different issues than
the NWRO of the 1960s. If there is a new era of activism, poverty
lawyers will most likely play.a valuable, but decidedly auxiliary, role
in the effort.130
Contemporary methods of poverty law reform must be under-
stood within this social and political context. They offer techniques
and expertise in extracting resources from society in order to bene-
fit poor individuals and communities. Without any ability to pose a
credible political threat, poverty lawyers have become adept at
squeezing resources out of hostile agencies and legislative bodies at
all levels of government. If poverty lawyers abandoned their work
at the state and national levels to pursue purely local grass-roots
strategies, a void would result. Many more illegal policies and prac-
129. Apart from all other problems, Congress has drastically undercut the ability of legal
services programs to play such a role. When Congress created the Legal Services Corpora-
tion in 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355,88 Stat. 378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2996 et seq.
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)), it imposed a battery of restrictions aimed at keeping legal services
programs out of any activities that could be construed as political. Thus, legal services pro-
grams cannot use their federal funds to "support or conduct training programs for the pur-
pose of advocating particular public policies or encouraging political activities," 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(b)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), or to "initiate the formation, or act as an organizer, of
any association, federation or similar entity," 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Although these restrictions are subject to qualifications and programs can engage in such
activities with funds obtained from other sources, they provide a strong disincentive to focus-
ing on grass-roots organizing as anything more than an adjunct to other work.
130. Moreover, it is easy to romanticize the image of the lawyer as servant of the social
movement. In reality, legal representation of grass-roots organizations poses its own difficult
questions about the role of the lawyer. For example, grass-roots organizations tend to have
weak decisionmaking structures. This weakness frequently leads to internecine conflict. See
KArz, supra note 47, at 97-102; PrynN & CLowAm, supra note 6, at 349-53. Additionally,
grass-roots organizations working on the same issues often disagree about strategies and
goals. How is the lawyer to know which organization is more representative of the larger
community? Lastly, grass-roots organizations may be dominated by subgroups with interests
that do not coincide with other constituencies of the group. For example, some have claimed
that the NWRO focused on protecting the interests of public assistance recipients in large
.urbanized states to the detriment of those in rural communities. See, eg., DANIL P. MOYNI-
HAN, Tim PoLrncs OF A GuARANTEED INCOME 334 (1973).
In sum, my point is not that lawyers should avoid grass-roots organizations but only that
such work also places lawyers in situations where any action they take could be viewed as an
exercise of power. The underlying issue is who is the client. Is the client the leadership of the
group, each of the individual members, or the larger community whose interest the group
seeks to promote? For a fuller discussion of the issues raised by group representation, see
Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied. Individual Autonomy and Collective Mo-
bilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REv. 1103 (1992).
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tices would go unchallenged. Social services agencies would be-
come even harsher and more punitive as the deterrent effect of
poverty lawyers' work eroded.
Similarly, the much-criticized reliance of poverty lawyers on liti-
gation stems not from a lack of imagination but from the fact that
litigation, limited as it is, is one of the few vehicles for change in
American society that can be used without a political power
base. 131 It provides a means of presenting claims as legal entitle-
ments, rather than as toothless political aspirations. 32 Moreover, it
can act as a catalyst to prod other actors in the political process. 33
In an era when the administrative state is buffeted by countless
competing demands, litigation can play a critical role in focusing the
attention of officials and of the public on an issue. 34
A second objection posed by academic critics is that the tech-
niques developed by poverty lawyers disempower poor clients be-
131. The extent to which poverty lawyers rely on litigation should not be overstated. As
Ann Southworth has recently pointed out, the claims of recent critics that poverty lawyers
have adopted a narrow litigation-oriented approach to issues appear to be exaggerated. Ann
Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L. Ray. 213, 230
(1994).
Allen Redlich, on the other hand, criticizes legal services programs as "in a sorry state"
because they are under litigious. Allen Redlich, Who Will Litigate Constitutional Issues for
the Poor?, 19 HAsrNGS CoNsr. L.Q. 745, 749 (1992). Redlich's conclusion is based on
Westlaw and LEXIS data concerning legal services involvement in federal and state appellate
litigation that results in judicial decisions included in these data bases. These data show a
significant drop in the total level of such involvement and a wide variation among programs.
Id. at 765-74. Redlich does not focus on law reform litigation per se. Id. at 760-61, n.115.
But, if accurate, his conclusions about the quality of legal services lawyering cannot be
viewed as restricted to the area of direct service work.
It is difficult to evaluate the reasons for this decline. Several explanations other than a
decline in the quality of legal services lawyering may account for it. First, many types of
litigation do not routinely result in reported judicial decisions though other types of litigation
yield such decisions frequently. A program that focuses on landlord-tenant work will appear
less litigious than a program that concentrates on representation of clients seeking federal
disability benefits. Second, the lack of receptivity of the federal courts to lawsuits brought by
legal services programs may lead programs to decrease their reliance on federal litigation.
The corpus of adverse precedent that has developed over the past fifteen years also makes it
difficult to simply shift lawsuits to the state courts. See supra note 96. The decline in litiga-
tion may be due to a realistic appraisal of the decreasing prospects for success, without indi-
cating that legal services programs have lost either their litigation skills or their zeal. As
Southworth suggests, programs may have turned to other approaches. Lastly, the trend
could reflect the sorry state of funding for legal services, without indicating the decline in
competence that Redlich suggests.
132. See PARmuciA WauAMs, THm ALCHEMY OF RACE AND Rors, 159-65 (1991);
Sparer, supra note 34, at 516-52. For a critique of rights discourse, see Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAs L. REv. 1363 (1984).
133. See MNfE , supra note 86, at 147-48, 160-62, 176-77.
134. At this point, there is a substantial literature refuting the notion that litigation can
bring about fundamental social change and criticizing its use as a tool for that purpose. Ger-
ald Rosenberg, for example, likens litigation to a flypaper that attracts and traps social re-
formers. See ROSENBERG, supra note 16, at 341; see also Abel, supra note 4, at 593-606(discussing the limitations of the legal system as a vehicle for social change). The point that
litigation cannot transform society, 'however, should not blind us to its value in achieving
more limited goals.
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cause they rely upon strategies that substitute lawyers' versions of
events for those of clients. 135 According to this argument, poverty
lawyers' accounts frequently stress the weakness and victimization
of clients, thereby perpetuating stereotypes of poor people as help-
less and dependent. 136 As Alfieri has put it, the poverty lawyer
"takes" the client's dignity.137
Scholarly literature that assists and encourages poverty lawyers
- and other lawyers - to listen with more care to their clients and
to explain their analysis and advice more fully is extremely valua-
ble. But I am not persuaded that the basic methodology of poverty
lawyers is flawed. The criticism assumes that clients view legal rep-
resentation more as a vehicle for self-expression than as a means of
obtaining stated material outcomes. 138 Most clients represented by
legal services programs, however, have a material objective of un-
usual importance, such as avoiding eviction or obtaining critically
needed subsistence benefits. Because this objective can only be ob-
tained by persuading some kind of decisionmaker, such as a judge
or administrator, its attainment depends on casting the claim in a
form that will be comprehensible and compelling to this third per-
son, both in terms of equities and the legal framework that the deci-
sionmaker will employ. Poverty lawyers are uniquely skilled in
translating139 the accounts of poor clients into claims that can per-
suade decisionmakers who are separated from such clients by vast
cultural, economic, and racial barriers.14° Although the ultimate
135. See Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 4, at 811-12; see also Gilkerson, supra note
4, at 944-45; White, Subordination, supra note 4, at 46.
136. Gilkerson, supra note 4, at 944-45; White, Subordination, supra note 4, at 46.
137. Alfiei, supra note 48, at 1751.
138. See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 4, at 2146 ("Winning the case...
may extend beyond material benefits and compensation to encompass... affirmation of
individual or group identity and dignity."); Gilkerson, supra note 4, at 916 ("The client's
narrative goal, expressed in the telling of her story, may not always be attained through
traditional measures of success."). Litigation does have expressive and symbolic aspects that
may be important even apart from the material outcome of the case. Cf LAURENCE H.
TmiuE, AMERiCAN CONsTrrunONAL LAW § 10-7, at 666 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that hearings
required by due process provide a "valued human interaction" that acknowledges the dignity
of those affected); Frank Michehman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Pro-
cess, in XVIII NoMos 126, 127-28 (f. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977) (due
process procedures "may... be psychologically important to the individual: to have played a
part in, to have made one's apt contribution to, decisions which are about oneself may be
counted important even though the decision, as it turns out, is the most unfavorable one
imaginable and one's efforts have not proved influential").
139. See Clark Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text" Towards
an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CoRiNLL L. REv. 1298 (1992).
140. Recent scholarship has focused on the gaps between lawyers and poor clients but
has ignored the gap between decisionmakers and poor clients. Ninety percent of the appoin-
tees of Presidents Reagan and Bush to the federal district courts and courts of appeals were
white. Sheldon Goldman, Bush's Judicial Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICA'URE 282,
287, 293 (1993). Eighty percent were white males. Id. A third of President Bush's appoin-
tees to the district courts were millionaires. Id.
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choice of strategy must remain in clients' hands, if lawyers ceased to
translate their clients' narratives in this way, rather than coming
away from the experience "empowered," many clients would come
away empty-handed. 41
Many poor clients understand the importance of strategy in
legal advocacy and are readily familiar with the concept of present-
ing facts in a manner that is likely to persuade. Thus, rather than
experiencing representation as an event in which, as Alfieri puts it,
they are "silenced" 142 and their experiences "falsified,"'1 43 clients
may be receiving the services they sought. 44
Although it is possible that translating the client's claim in this
fashion reinforces the status quo in some sense, such an effect
would be marginal compared with the other much more powerful
forces that work to maintain it. For example, Alfieri criticizes pov-
erty lawyers for depicting claimants for disability benefits as inca-
pacitated.145 Any effect of such advocacy in reinforcing images of
poor people as helpless is dwarfed by the impact of a statutory
scheme that requires poor persons to show incapacity in order to
qualify for subsistence benefits. 46
Thirty years of experience demonstrates that poverty lawyers
should approach their work with a degree of realism and humility
about what they can accomplish. Lawyers must think in terms of
chipping away at poverty bit by bit, rather than sweeping it away in
141. Paul Tremblay has observed that critics who argue that poverty lawyers should focus
on giving voice to their clients are favoring the long-term goal of empowerment over the
short-term goal of obtaining a material end. See Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law
Practice, supra note 4, at 134-37. He questions whether many clients would make this choice.
See Dinerstein, supra note 4, at 987-88.
142. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 4, at 823-32.
143. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 4, at 2135.
144. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case
Theory, 93 Mici. L. Rav. 485 (1994). Professor Miller notes, "A client might choose silence
or a lawyer narrative over her own narrative to improve her chances of winning or to achieve
some other goal." Id. at 525.
145. See Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 4, at 811-28.
146. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (1988). Even on its own terms, the
issue of stigma is complex. In my experience as a disability lawyer, one reason clients seek
disability benefits is that they view the classification of "disabled" as less stigmatizing than
the alternative of being labeled a shirker - an individual who has the capacity to work but
chooses not to do so. Although one can readily take issue with the fairness or accuracy of
labeling all individuals who are not working as indolent, society imposes this label in many
ways, such as the exclusion of such individuals from federal cash benefit programs. An award
of disability benefits thus not only provides income that is often desperately needed but also
removes the stigma that accompanies the denial of a claim by the government.
Although advocacy for such benefits could be seen as "buying into" these classifications,
poor clients must live with these categories and sometimes internalize them. Moreover,
many clients gain a sense of empowerment and vindication through the realization of their




a tide of reform.147 They are engaged in a long-term fight, rather
than a glorious struggle, as Sparer and his colleagues envisioned.
This realization calls for strategies that have the potential to
achieve limited successes, rather than the constant pursuit of impos-
sible goals. Moreover, strategies aimed at forestalling cutbacks may
preserve past gains until the legal and political climate is more ame-
nable to claims of poor people.
The realization that lawyers will not be able to put an end to
poverty also calls for a recognition that there is no single correct
way to practice poverty law. Recent scholarship has been most val-
uable when it has suggested new approaches to old problems,
rather than in its critique of current methods of practice. I would
encourage lawyers to read the work of recent scholars and to seek
to implement the principles elucidated in the literature. I am not
convinced, however, that all other modes of practice are either in-
effectual, counterproductive, or illegitimate. Poverty lawyers
should not casually abandon techniques they have refined over the
years that can yield tangible successes. Instead, there is ample
room for a diversity of approaches and methods, each of which has
some benefits to offer.
CONCLUSION
In the Introduction to Brutal Need, Davis writes that the book is
intended "to provide both inspiration and perspective" to the pov-
erty lawyers seeking to build on the work of their predecessors of
the 1960s (p. 3). Brutal Need is successful in both these respects.
The passion, creativity, and energy of the book's protagonists pres-
ent a challenge to today's poverty lawyers and to those in genera-
tions to come to stretch themselves to do more and to experiment
with new approaches to long-standing problems. All such chal-
lenges to rethink accepted truths and norms are valuable, and there
is much that could be improved in poverty law practice.
At the same time, much recent scholarly literature has been too
judgmental of the work of contemporary poverty lawyers. The
work of contemporary poverty lawyers is less flamboyant or dra-
matic than that of their predecessors. Detached from any grand
theory of social change, the current work in this area may appear ad
hoc and piecemeal. But any fair assessment must acknowledge that
contemporary poverty lawyers work in a harsh and increasingly
hostile climate. Poverty lawyers in the 1960s worked in the context
of an active social movement and a rich progressive culture that
generated ideas and support for their efforts. In contrast, contem-
porary poverty lawyers work in an era in which allies are few and
147. See HtNLE, supra note 59, at 233.
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far between. Since the 1960s, the forces seeking social justice have
fallen into a state of confusion and disarray, leaving poverty lawyers
and their clients standing virtually alone.148
It is no wonder that in this environment, the work of poverty
lawyers appears to lack an overriding theory. Instead, it is rooted in
the practical realities of the moment. It strives for attainment of
what is possible. On these terms, it often succeeds. That is no small
accomplishment.
148. As Michael Katz has written, progressive social thought has "failed to assemble a
powerful and popular new defense of equality and social justice." MtcHAEr. KArz, THE UN-
DESERVING POOR 166-84 (1989).
